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Entrepreneurs bear substantial risk, but empirical evidence shows no sign
of a positive premium. This paper develops a theory of endogenous en-
trepreneurial risk taking that explains why self-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs may
ﬁnd it optimal to invest into risky projects oﬀering no risk premium. The
model has also a number of implications for ﬁrm dynamics supported by
empirical evidence, such as a positive correlation between survival, size, and
ﬁrm age.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs bear substantial risk. According to recent estimates1, to com-
pensate for the extra risk entrepreneurial returns (return to private equity)
should exceed public equity by at least 10 percent. Yet the evidence shows no
signs of a positive premium.2 A number of hypotheses have been oﬀered to
explain this puzzle, all of them based on the idea that entrepreneurs have a
diﬀerent set of preferences (e.g. risk tolerance or overoptimism.) This paper
provides an alternative theory of endogenous entrepreneurial risk-taking that
does not rely on individual heterogeneity.
The key ingredients in our theory are borrowing constraints, the exis-
tence of an outside opportunity and endogenous risk choice. A self-ﬁnanced
entrepreneur chooses every period how much to invest in a project, which
is chosen from a set of alternatives. All available projects oﬀer the same
expected return but a diﬀerent variance. After returns are realized, the en-
trepreneur decides whether to exit and take the outside opportunity (e.g.
become a worker) or to stay in business.
The possibility of exit creates a nonconcavity in the entrepreneurs’ con-
tinuation value: for values of wealth below a certain threshold, the outside
opportunity gives higher utility; for higher wealth levels, entrepreneurial ac-
tivity is preferred. Risky projects provide lotteries over future wealth that
eliminate this nonconcavity and are particularly valuable to entrepreneurs
with wealth levels close to this threshold. As the level of wealth increases,
entrepreneurs invest in less risky projects.
It is the relatively poor entrepreneurs that decide to take more risk. At the
same time, due to self-ﬁnancing, they invest less in their projects than richer
entrepreneurs. Correspondingly, the model implies that survival rates of the
business are positively correlated with business size. Moreover, if agents
enter entrepreneurship with relatively low wealth levels (as occurs in a case
with endogenous entry that we study), our model also implies that young
businesses exhibit lower survival rates. It also appears that, conditional on
survival, small (younger) ﬁrms grow faster than larger (older) ones. All these
1These calculations assume standard levels of risk aversion (CRRA=2). See Heaton
and Lucas (2000).
2Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimate the return to entrepreneurial invest-
ment using data from SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances) and FFA/NIPA(the Flow of
Funds Accounts and National Income and Product Accounts) and report that the average
return to all private equity is similar to that of the public market equity index.
1implications are supported by strong empirical evidence from the literature
on ﬁrm dynamics (see, e.g. Evans 1987, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989
and Davis and Haltiwanger 1992).
In order to stress the role of risk taking, our model allows entrepreneurs
to choose completely safe projects with the same expected return. All exit
in our model occurs precisely because low wealth entrepreneurs purposively
choose risk. If risky projects were not available, no exit would occur.
As mentioned above, three features are key to our model: the existence
of an outside opportunity, ﬁnancial constraints and the endogenous choice
of risk. Many papers consider some of these features separately, but as far
as we know ours is the ﬁrst that considers all of them together. Discrete
occupational choices appear in several papers, following Lucas (1978). Bor-
rowing constraints have been considered in several recent papers (Gomes
2001, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2002, Clementi and Hopenhayn 2002)
and is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Evans and Jo-
vanovic (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988) and others. The use of lotteries to convexify discrete choice sets was
introduced in the macro literature by Rogerson (1988).
A number of papers address the question of which agents decide to be-
come entrepreneurs. All these models rely on some source of heterogeneity.
The classical work in this ﬁeld is a general equilibrium model by Kihlstrom
and Laﬀont (1979), where it is assumed that agents diﬀer in their degrees
of risk aversion. Obviously the least risk averse agents are selected into en-
trepreneurship, which is assumed to be a risky activity. In a recent paper,
Cressy (1999) points out that diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion can be the
result of diﬀerences in wealth. In particular, if preferences exhibit decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA), wealthier agents become entrepreneurs. The
same happens in the occupational choice model described in the paper, but
due to the presence of borrowing constraints.
The empirical regularities on ﬁrm dynamics have been explained in mod-
els by Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericson and Pakes (1995).
These models rely on exogenous shocks to ﬁrms’ productivities and selec-
tion. In Jovanovic the source is learning about (ex-ante) heterogeneity in
entrepreneurial skills. In Hopenhayn survival rates and the dynamics of re-
turns are determined by an exogenous stochastic process of ﬁrms’ productiv-
ity shocks and the distribution of entrants. In Ericson and Pakes the shocks
aﬀect the outcome of investments made by ﬁrms.
In contrast to the studies listed above, we do not assume any hetero-
2geneity in risk aversion (as in Kihlstrom and Laﬀont), or in the returns to
entrepreneurial activity (as in Jovanovic). In our setup risk taking is a volun-
tary decision of agents and not an ex ante feature of the available technology
(as in Kihlstrom and Laﬀont, and Cressy). In contrast to Hopenhayn (1992),
we endogenize the stochastic process that drives ﬁrm dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model
of entrepreneurial risk choice. In this section the outside opportunity is
described by a function of wealth with some general properties. This section
gives the core results of the paper. Section 3 gives a detailed occupational
choice model that endogenizes the outside value function. There is entry
and exit from employment to entrepreneurship. We explore conditions under
which risk taking occurs in equilibrium and provide benchmark computations
to assess its value.
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
The entrepreneur is an inﬁnitely lived risk averse agent with time separable
utility u(c) and discount factor ¯: Assume u(c) is concave, strictly increasing
and satisﬁes standard Inada conditions. The entrepreneur starts a period
with accumulated wealth w. At the beginning of each period he ﬁrst decides
whether to continue in business or to quit and get an outside value R(w),
which is an increasing and concave function of his wealth. Entrepreneurs
are self-ﬁnanced and while in business face the following set of investment
opportunities.
There is a set of available projects with random return e Ak; where k
is the amount invested. Entrepreneurs must choose one of these projects
and the investment level k · w: All projects oﬀer the same expected return
E e A = A, but diﬀerent levels of risk. We assume the expected return A > 1=¯.
The distribution of a project’s rates of return is concentrated in two points,
x · y. (As shown later, this assumption is without loss of generality.) If
the low return x is realized with probability 1 ¡ p, the average return is
A = (1 ¡ p)x + py, and the high return y may be expressed as




3Thus, we will identify every available project by the value of the lower return
x and the probability of the higher return p. Denote by Ω2(A) the set of
available projects 3,
Ω2(A) = f(x;p)jx 2 [0;A];p 2 [0;1]g:
If x = A or p = 1 the project is safe, delivering the return A for sure; for
all other values of x and p the project is risky. The existence of riskless
projects that are not dominated in expected return is obviously an extreme
assumption. It is convenient for technical reasons and it helps to emphasize
the point that risk taking is not necessarily associated with higher returns.
Intuitively, risk taking in this set up occurs due to the presence of the
outside opportunity. If risky projects are not available, the value of an ac-




fu(w ¡ k) + ¯Vl(Ak)g: (2)
If R(w) and Vl(w) have at least one intersection, the value of the entrepreneur
with the option to quit is a non-concave function maxfR(w);Vl(w)g. This
nonconcavity suggests that a lottery on wealth levels could be welfare im-
proving. As will be seen, in the absence of such lottery, an entrepreneur may
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to invest in a risky project.
If risk taking is possible, an entrepreneur with current wealth w that de-
cides to stay in business, picks a project (x;p) 2 Ω2(A) and the amount of
wealth k 2 [0;w] invested into this project. Given that the entrepreneur has
no access to ﬁnancing, consumption will equal w¡k: By the beginning of the
following period the return of the project is realized, giving the entrepreneur
wealth yk in case of success or xk in case of failure. At this stage the en-
trepreneur must decide again whether to continue in business or to quit and
take the outside value.
Letting V (w) denote the value for an entrepreneur with wealth w at the
begging of the period (exit stage), the value VE (w) at the investment stage
3Subindex 2 corresponds to the number of mass points of the payoﬀs’distribution
4Note that the the return in (2) is unbounded (due to A¯ > 1), so we must assume
that the agents’ utility function u(c) is such that the solution to (2) exists. This is true




fu(w ¡ k) + ¯[pV (yk) + (1 ¡ p)V (xk)]g;





In turn, the agent’s initial value and exit decision are given by:
V (w) = maxfVE(w);R(w)g: (4)
We will call (3)-(4) the optimal risk choice problem (ORCP). Its solution
gives the entrepreneur’s exit decision, consumption path and project risk
choice. The latter is the main focus of our work. An entrepreneur who
chooses p < 1 invests into a risky project. The risk of business failure is
larger for smaller values of p. As we show below, risk taking decreases with
the level of wealth while total investment increases. Using the scale of the
project (i.e. total investment) as a measure of business size, the model implies
that smaller ﬁrms take more risk and face higher failure rates.
2.2 The Solution
This section characterizes the solution to the entrepreneurial choice problem.
We divide the problem in three steps: 1) project risk choice; 2) consump-
tion/investment decision and 3) exit decision. A sketch of the main features
of the solution is given here. More details and proofs are provided in the
appendix.
2.2.1 Project risk choice
Let k denote the total investment in the project. The expected payoﬀ is then
Ak; independently of the level of risk chosen. Figure 1 illustrates this decision
problem. If the end-of-period wealth is below wE; the entrepreneur will quit
and take the outside option; if it is above he will stay in business. The
continuation value V (Ak) is thus given by the envelope of the two concave5
functions, R(w) and VE(w). As a consequence of the option to exit, this
value is not a concave function in end-of-period wealth.
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Figure 1: End-of-period expected value VN(Ak) of entrepreneur
The choice of project risk is used to randomize end-of-period wealth on
the two points w and w depicted in Figure 1, giving an expected value that
corresponds to the concave envelope of the two value functions considered.6





R(Ak) for Ak · w;
R(w) + (Ak ¡ w)=(w ¡ w)(V (w) ¡ R(w)) for w < Ak < w;
V (Ak) for Ak ¸ w:
As shown in the ﬁgure, depending on the level of investment k, we may
distinguish three cases: If Ak · w; it is optimal not to randomize and exit
in the following period. In case Ak ¸ ¯ w; it is also optimal to invest in the
safe project. Finally, if w < Ak < ¯ w; it is optimal to randomize between the
two endpoints.
More formally, this choice is implied by the ﬁrst order conditions for the
6The ﬁgure assumes that R(w) and VE (w) have a unique intersection point. This
obviously depends on the outside value function. In section 3 we derive this outside value
function from a model of entrepreneurial choice and show that the single crossing property
holds.






V (yk) ¡ V (xk)
yk ¡ xk
: (5)
These two equations say that the possible project’s payoﬀs must coincide with
the tangent points w and w. Thus the optimal randomization is accomplished
by choosing the project with x = w=k; y = w=k and p = (Ak ¡ w)=(w ¡ w):
Note that the probability of the high payoﬀ (”success”) increases linearly with
the scale of the project k:
2.2.2 Consumption/Investment choice
Letting w denote the wealth of the entrepreneur and since projects are self-
ﬁnanced, the level of consumption c = w ¡ k: The consumption/investment
decision is the solution to the following problem:
VE (w) = max
k
u(w ¡ k) + ¯VN (Ak): (6)
VN(Ak) denotes the expected value of an entrepreneur by the beginning of
the next period if currently he invests k in the optimally chosen project. As
shown before, it is the concave envelope of V (w) and R(w):The following
lemma states that VN and thus VE are concave functions.
Lemma 1 (concavity of VE(w))
The possibility of investing into risky projects makes VE (w) concave.
We proceed to characterize the consumption/savings decision. The ﬁrst
order conditions for problem (6) are given by:
u










R0 (Ak) for Ak · w
R0 (w) = V 0
E ( ¯ w) for w < Ak < ¯ w
V 0 (Ak) for Ak ¸ ¯ w:
The above ﬁrst order conditions imply that consumption is constant at a
level c¤ given by u0(c¤) = ¯AR0 (w) when optimal investment Ak falls in the
7risk taking region, w < Ak < ¯ w: This corresponds to initial wealth levels w
such that wL < w < wH, where wL = w=A + c¤ and wH = ¯ w=A + c¤: In
this region, investment k = w ¡ c¤ increases linearly with the agent’s wealth
and the probability of a successful realization increases. Outside this region,
there is no risk taking and consumption and investment increase with wealth.
The above conditions also imply that once the wealth of the entrepreneur
surpasses the threshold wH; it grows continuously, remaining above ¯ w forever
after. From that point on, there is no more risk taking. This is a special
feature of the model explained by the existence of riskless projects and the
absence of risk premia. In a more realistic setup, ﬁrms could recur in the set
wL < w < wH after a series of bad shocks.
A sharper characterization of the value of the entrepreneur VE(w) follows
from the above comments. This value coincides with the value of a risk-
free entrepreneur Vl(w) for w ¸ wH; is linear in the intermediate range
wL < w < wH; coincides with the value of the entrepreneur that invests into
a safe project and quits in the following period for w · wL . Note that if
risky projects were not available, active entrepreneurs would face two options
- either to stay or exit- at the beginning of the following period. Risk taking
increases the entrepreneur’s utility by eliminating this nonconcavity in the
continuation value.
2.2.3 The optimal exit decision
The entrepreneur exits when R(w) > VE (w): A suﬃcient condition for this
region to be nonempty is that (1 ¡ ¯)R(0) > u(0): This condition is satisﬁed
when the outside option includes some other source of income. When R(w)
crosses VE (w) at a unique point wE, as in the example considered in section
3, this becomes the threshold for exit.
Suppose exit is given by a threshold policy with cutoﬀ value wE: Three
situations may arise: (i) wE · wL; (ii) wL < wE < wH and (iii) wH < wE:
For the last case, risk-taking would not be observed since entrepreneurs would
exit once they are in the risk-taking region. In the other two cases risk-taking
is observed. In case (ii), the entrepreneur invests in a risky project, exits if
it fails and stays forever if it succeeds. There is an upper bound on the
probability of failure given by (1 ¡ p(wE)) < 1: In contrast, in case (i) there
is no upper bound on project failure.7
7The example given in section 3 suggests that while case (i) is atypical, the other two
82.2.4 Characterization of the solution
The following Proposition summarizes the results derived in this section.
PROPOSITION 1 Suppose the entrepreneur selects projects from the class
Ω2(A) with an expected return A > 1=¯. Suppose the outside value of the
entrepreneur R(w) is concave. If R(w) and VE(w) have a unique intersection
point wE; then there exist wealth levels wL < wH such that:
(i) Entrepreneurs exit if w · wE and stay if w > wE;
(ii) Letting w¤ = maxfwL;wEg and w¤ = maxfwH;wEg:
(a) entrepreneurs invest in safe projects and stay in business forever
if w ¸ w¤;
(b) invest in risky projects if w 2 (w¤;w¤) and stay in business the
following period with probability p(w) = (Ak(w) ¡ w)=(w ¡ w);
(c) invest in safe projects if w · w¤ and exit in the following period.
(iii) If an entrepreneur chooses a risky project (i.e. w 2 (w¤;w¤)), the prob-
ability of survival p(w) and the level of investment k(w) are increasing
in w, while consumption c(w) is constant.
The previous Proposition has some immediate implications for ﬁrm dy-
namics. In the following, we measure a ﬁrm’s size by the level of its invest-
ment k:
CORROLLARY 1 (i) Survival probability increases with ﬁrm size (ii) Con-
ditional on survival, smaller ﬁrms have higher growth rates.
The above results assume a single crossing of the functions R(w) and
VE (w): In case of multiple crossings, there will be more than one region of
risk-taking. Within each of these regions, total investment will increase and
the risk of failure decrease with wealth.
cases may occur.
92.3 Extending the Class of Projects
In the above analysis we assume that the only projects available to en-
trepreneurs have returns concentrated in two points. In this section we show
that this restriction is without loss of generality..
Let Ω(A) = f¸j
R
d¸ = 1 and
R
zd¸(z) = Ag. This is the set of all
probability distributions of returns with mean A: Obviously, the class Ω2(A)
considered earlier is a subset of Ω(A). Thus, if we assume the entrepreneur
chooses a project from Ω(A), all projects (x;p) 2 Ω2(A) are still available to
him.
The following Proposition gives our main result in this section.
PROPOSITION 2 Suppose the outside value of the entrepreneur R(w)
satisﬁes the assumptions of Proposition 1. Let the entrepreneur choose any
project from Ω(A), where ¯A > 1. Then the distribution of returns of the
project chosen is concentrated in two points, so the entrepreneurial decision
is identical to the one described in Proposition 1.
The proof of Proposition 2 is very intuitive. The decision problem (3) of
the active entrepreneur is now given by:
VE = max
k;¸









Together with the exit decision (4) it forms a well deﬁned dynamic program-
ming problem which has a unique solution.
If VE(w) coincides with the value function (3) found in the previous sec-
tion, the value of the entrepreneur V (w) is a piecewise concave function over
the intervals (0;wE) and (wE;+1) (this follows from Lemma 1). For any
given distribution of returns ¸; Let x¸ and y¸ be the expected returns on
the intervals (0;wE) and (wE;+1); respectively. Let p¸ = ¸(wE;+1); the
probability of the upper set of returns. Consider an alternative project that
pays either x¸ (with probability 1 ¡ p¸) and y¸ (with probability p¸). Given
that the value function is concave in the two regions considered, the expected
return of this project is at least as high as the original one.
103 An Example: Occupational Choice Model
In Section 2 no interpretation was provided for the outside value. In this
Section we endogenize R(w) in a simple occupational choice model, study
conditions under which risk taking will and will not occur, and provide some
simulation results.
3.1 The Set Up of the Model
The decision problem of the entrepreneur is deﬁned by (3) and (4) of the
previous section. An entrepreneur becomes a worker if he exits from business.
Workers receive wage Á > 0 every period and save in a risk free bond to
smooth consumption over time. The rate of return to the risk-free bond is
r. We assume that 1=¯ · 1 + r < A. This assumption, combined with self-
ﬁnancing, implies that only relatively wealthy agents are willing to become
entrepreneurs.
At the beginning of every period a worker gets randomly ”hit with an
idea” that allows him to become an entrepreneur. The probability of this
event is 0 · q · 1. If the worker chooses to become an entrepreneur he
receives no wage income. If the worker decides not to enter entrepreneurship,
his situation becomes identical to that of a worker who was not faced with
this opportunity. Let R(w) denote the value of the worker conditional on not
becoming an entrepreneur in the current period. Prior to the realization of
the shock, the value to the worker Rc(w) is given by
Rc(w) = (1 ¡ q)R(w) + q maxfVE(w);R(w)g: (8)
This value deﬁnes the continuation value of the agent who is a worker in
the current period. If the worker does not enter entrepreneurship, he must
decide how much to save in the risk free bond, so his value R(w) is given by:
R(w) = max
a
fu(w + Á ¡ a) + ¯Rc((1 + r)a)g: (9)
The above two equations, together with (3) and (4) fully characterize the
behavior of the agents in this discrete occupational choice model.
3.2 The Solution
The worker becomes an entrepreneur only if: (i) he gets an opportunity; and
(ii) his current wealth level is such that VE(w) ¸ R(w). Denote by wE the
11lowest wealth level at which workers are willing to enter entrepreneurship,
VE(wE) = R(wE), which determines the entry threshold rule for the workers.
Since there is no entry or exit cost, wE determines the exit threshold rule
for the entrepreneurs. In the general setup, the entrepreneurial investment
decision was described in Proposition 1, which requires concavity of R(w)
and single crossing of R(w) and VE(w). Below we show that although these
properties not necessarily hold, the results of Proposition 1 are still valid.
Lemma 2 (Characterization of R(w))
Let 1=¯ · 1+r < A, R(w) solves (3), (4), (8) and (9), and a(w) determines
the worker’s optimal rule of saving. Let b R(w) be the concave envelope of
R(w). Then
(i) if q > 0 then R(w) is not concave;
(ii) if w · wE then the wealth proﬁle of the worker increases over time, i.e.
(1 + r)a(w) > w;
(iii) if R(w) = b R(w) then R((1 + r)a(w)) = b R((1 + r)a(w));
(iv) if R(w) is replaced with b R(w) in (4) then the behavior of the en-
trepreneurs investing in the projects with strictly positive probability
of survival does not change.
The main implication of Lemma 2 is that although the value of the worker
R(w) is not concave, we may use its concave envelope b R(w) in order to
describe the behavior of entrepreneurs. Nonconcavity of R(w) is driven by
the presence of the kink in the worker’s continuation value function that
necessarily occurs in wE. Since below wE the worker chooses an increasing
in time wealth proﬁle in order to beneﬁt from becoming an entrepreneur
in future, the kink in wE is recursively reproduced onto the lower values of
wealth. Therefore R(w) is piecewisely concave to the left of wE.
The behavior of a risk taking entrepreneur randomizing between exiting
and staying in business in the next period is determined by the tangent
points of R(w) and VE(w) with their common tangent line. Obviously, these
tangent points, as well as the tangent line itself, do not shift if instead of R(w)
its concave envelope b R(w) is used. Constructing and analyzing the concave
envelope of R(w) is useful for one more reason. The part (iii) of Lemma 2
says that if the current value of the worker falls into the strictly concave part
12of b R(w), his continuation value also belongs to the strictly concave part of
b R(w). This property will be used later on to derive the uniqueness of the
observed entry point wE.
In the absence of risk taking opportunities the continuation value of the
entrepreneur is given by maxfR(w);VE(w)g. Apart from the kink in every
point where R(w) = VE(w), this function has a number of kink points gen-
erated by nonconcavity of R(w). Since risk taking allows entrepreneur to
eliminate all this kinks, two types of risk takers may be potentially observed:
those who randomize between exiting and staying in the next period, and
those who exit for sure.
In the following Lemma we prove that there exists only one region of ran-
domization with a positive probability of survival, i.e. that b R(w) and VE(w)
have a unique intersection. At the same time, we cannot eliminate multiple
intersection between R(w) and VE(w), and that is why randomization fol-
lowed by exit in the following period (unconditional on the realized payoﬀ)
may occur. However, this type of randomization places the worker’s next pe-
riod value on the strictly concave part of b R(w), and thus, by (iii) of Lemma
2, the sequence of all his future values will also fall into a strictly concave
part, and no randomization with zero probability of business survival will
be needed. Therefore, assuming without the loss of generality that initial
wealth of every worker falls into a strictly concave part of b R(w) (or equal to
zero), we conclude that only risk taking with positive probability of survival
may be observed. Correspondingly, the cutoﬀ entry wealth level is unique.
Lemma 3 (Entry rule)
(i) There exist a unique wE such that b R(wE) = VE(wE) and b R(w) > VE(w)
for w < wE;
(ii) no entry is observed below wE.
Figure 2 depicts the value functions previously deﬁned. The intersec-
tion of R(w) and VE(w) (solid thin lines) determines the entry wealth level
wE. For w > wE, VE(w) > R(w), so every worker chooses entrepreneurship
whenever this option is available to him. Since this occurs with probability q,
Rc(w) is a linear combination of VE(w) and R(w) for w ¸ wNE. If w · wE,
the worker does not enter entrepreneurship, independently of the realized










Figure 2: Value functions’ allocation in the occupational choice model.
worker’s current and continuation values R(w) and Rc(w) concave to the left
of wE, although a number of kinks occurs in this region.
Now we may use Lemmas 2 and 3 to characterize the behavior of the
agents’ in this occupational choice economy:
PROPOSITION 3 If entry, exit and investment choice is deﬁned by (3),
(4), (8), and (9), then there exist 0 < w < wE and 0 < wH < w such that
(i) workers with wealth levels w > wE enter into entrepreneurship with
probability q;
(ii) entrepreneurs exit from business if w · wE and stay otherwise;
(iii) entrepreneurs with wealth levels wE · w · maxfwE;wHg invest into
risky projects, survival rates p(w) of their businesses are bounded away
from zero and increase with w, investment k(w) also increases, while
consumption c(w) stays constant;
(iv) entrepreneurs with wealth levels w > maxfwE;wHg invest into fully
safe projects and stay in business forever; their investment k(w) and
consumption c(w) increase in w.
14From Proposition 3 it follows that if an entrepreneur enters with wealth
levels w < wH; he invests in a risky project, obtaining either w or w at
the beginning of the following period, depending on the realization of the
project’s return. If the low return is realized, the entrepreneur exits in the
next period with wealth w < wE, otherwise he invests into a fully safe project
from next period on. The probability p(w) of the high return determines the
survival probability of the establishment. Those entrepreneurs who enter
with higher levels of wealth choose higher p(w) and thus are more likely to
stay in business.
3.3 Risk Taking
Risk taking not necessarily occurs in this environment. In particular, if the
entry wealth level wE exceeds the upper bound of the randomization region
(wH), risky investments will never be chosen. In the environment described
above this happens if q = 1, i.e., if there is no uncertainty about being able
to enter entrepreneurship.
PROPOSITION 4 There exist 0 · q < 1 such that risk taking does not
occur if q ¸ q.
The result in the above Proposition is driven by the agents’ desire to
smooth consumption over time. In the absence of uncertainty, the worker
correctly foresees his continuation value maxfR(w);VE(w)g and thus chooses
a savings policy such that the downward jump in consumption at the mo-
ment he enters entrepreneurship is small. Correspondingly, the kink in the
value function at the point of entry is so small that randomizations are not
beneﬁcial.
In contrast, in the presence of an uninsurable shock to entrepreneurial
opportunities, the continuation value and optimal savings policy prior to the
shock realization change after the resolution of this uncertainty. If the ex-post
desired investment increases compared to its ex-ante desired level , current
consumption would obviously go down. The possibility of risk taking allows
an entrepreneur to decrease the size of this downward jump in consumption.
In particular, as a consequence of the outside opportunity, the entrepreneur
consumes more than the safe investment policy suggests - actually, as much
as the entrepreneur with wealth level wH does - and the rest of his wealth
invests in risky projects. In the following period, independent of the project’s
15payoﬀ, he raises consumption up to c such that u0(c) = R0(w) = V 0
E(w). And
only the future path of consumption will depend on the realized return of the
risky project. Finally, only entrepreneurs with relatively low wealth levels
use this consumption smoothing mechanism - because it is only for them that
the outside opportunity provides the necessary insurance in case of project
failure.
3.4 A Partial Case: ¯(1 + r) = 1
In the case of ¯(1 + r) = 1 all the previous results imply but more may
be said about entry threshold rule and the properties of risk taking. First
of all, note that if entry into entrepreneurship is not possible (q = 0), the
worker’s wealth and consumption stay constant over time. The presence of
entrepreneurial opportunity in future stimulates worker’s wealth proﬁle to
grow until it reaches the wealth level at which opening business is eﬃcient.
The allocation of the value functions associated with this partial case is
illustrated on Figure 4 (in the end of the paper). It is easy to verify (directly
follows from the proof of Lemma 2) that that b Rc(w) is now linear in the
interval (0;wE). Then, obviously, there exist no common tangent line to R(w)
and VE(w), and thus risk taking entrepreneurs choose the corner solution
x = 0 and end up with wealth w = 0 if their businesses fail. Correspondingly,
the value function VE(w) of the entrepreneur is linear to the left of wH.
Since Lemma 2 applies, b R(w) and VE(w) have single intersection. If risk
taking occurs (wH > wE) then at the intersection point V 0
E(wE) exceeds
R0
c(wE) and, correspondingly, the linear part of VE(w) is steeper than the
linear part of b R(w). On the other hand, in the proof of Lemma 2 it is
shown that the worker with wealth w¤
0 (the closest to wE kink point) saves
more than wE=(1 + r) for the next period. Consequently, limw!w¤
0+ R(w) <
R0
c(wE) < V 0
E(wE) = V 0
E(w0). Therefore, no intersection of VE(w) and R(w)
may occur in the neighborhood of w¤
0. Similarly, no intersection may occur
in the neighborhoods of the lower kink points. That is why, no entry into en-
trepreneurship occurs below wE, independently of the initial workers’ wealth
distribution.
3.5 The Numerical Example
The following numerical example illustrates the implications of the preceding
theoretical analysis. We use the following parameter values: ¯ = 0:98, r is
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Figure 3: Optimal project choice, u(c) = ln(c), q = 0:2.
equal to the inverse of the rate of time preference 1=¯, and the expected
entrepreneurial return A is 10 percent higher than the return to the risk-
free bond. In this example we choose a logarithmic utility function u(c) =
ln(c) and later consider how the behavior of entrepreneurs changes as the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion increases. Since receiving an opportunity
to open business is a random event, entry into entrepreneurship may occur
at any wealth level above wE. The two top plots of Figure 3 depict survival
probability and return conditional on survival as a function of business size.
As was summarized in Corollary 1, larger establishments are more likely to
survive, but experience lower rates of returns. Note that in this economy exit
from entrepreneurship occurs only due to the presence of risk taking: if the
risky projects are not available, the homogeneity of expected project’s returns
together with condition 1=¯ · 1 + r < A implies that all entrepreneurs
continue operating their businesses once the entry decision has been made.
The bottom left plot of Figure 3 presents the welfare gain that risk taking
entrepreneurs obtain due to the availability of risky projects. Most of all
17beneﬁt those entrepreneurs who enter with the wealth level equal to the cutoﬀ
entry wealth in the absence of risky projects. For these agents the welfare
gain is fairly high: they would lose 4.3 percent of their life-time consumption
if the risky investment were not available.
The bottom right graph plots the amount of risk premium needed to
compensate for risk taking if the outside opportunity were not available. In
this example, the poorest entrepreneur bearing the largest risk would require
37% of risk premium for the investment they make if they were not able to
use an outside opportunity as an insurance instrument.
Obviously, the behavior of entrepreneurs depends on the arrival rate of
the entrepreneurial opportunity. In accordance with Proposition 4, if open-
ing a business is an event that may be planned long in advance, the worker
organizes his consumption path in such a way that the downward jump in con-
sumption at the moment of entering entrepreneurship is small, and thus risk
taking is not beneﬁcial. However, if the decision to become an entrepreneur
is made unexpectedly, risky investment allow entrepreneur to adjust his con-
sumption path gradually. Table 1 shows how the amount of risk taken and
the required risk premium change if entry into entrepreneurship gets more
predictable (q increases).
Table 1: Risk taking and required risk premium
q 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
minp(w) 0.31 0.55 0.71 0.80 0.87 0.93 0.96 0.99 -
max RP 0.49 0.37 0.30 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.06 0.01 -
The ﬁrst raw of Table 1 reports the lowest survival rate that is observed
in the economy. If the opportunity to enter entrepreneurship is a rare event
(q = 0:1), workers facing this opportunity at relatively low wealth levels
decide to enter and invest into very risky projects, exiting with probabil-
ity 1 ¡ p(w) = 0:69 in the following period. If the risky projects were not
available, the poorest entrepreneur would require a risk premium of approx-
imately half of the expected entrepreneurial return to compensate for the
amount of risk he takes. As the probability of the entrepreneurial opportu-
nity increases, less risk taking occurs. This happens because as q increases,
18workers make better predictions about their future optimal investment level,
and thus when the entrepreneurial opportunity arrives it leads to smaller
jumps in consumption, decreasing entrepreneur’s incentives for risk taking.
According to Proposition 4, there exists a maximum q such that no one makes
risky investment if entry into entrepreneurship is possible with probability
higher than q. In the simulated example q ¼ 0:81.
4 Final Remarks
Entrepreneurship is risky, but there appears to be no premium to private eq-
uity. Any theory addressing this puzzle must rely, directly or indirectly, on a
positive -or at least neutral- attitude towards risk. Earlier papers in this area
assume directly that entrepreneurs have a lower degree of risk aversion. In
our paper, the indirect utility function of the entrepreneur has a nonconcave
region, where riskiness is desired. However, this nonconcavity is created by
the existence of an outside opportunity so it does not rely on assumptions
about preferences for risk.
As a theory of risk taking, our model has speciﬁc implications. The
combination of the outside option and ﬁnancing constraints imply a desire
for risk at low wealth levels, close to the exit threshold. As a consequence,
risk taking decreases with the level of wealth, giving rise to the positive
correlation between size (measured by investment) and survival found in the
data. This is an implication of our theory that would be hard to derive just
from the heterogeneity of preferences. As an example, Cressy (2000) justiﬁes
risk-taking by entrepreneurs assuming that higher wealth makes agents less
risk averse. A consequence of this assumption is that larger ﬁrms should
take more risk and thus exhibit more variable growth, which is counter to
the data.
Entrepreneurs in our model are self-ﬁnanced. This is obviously an ex-
treme form of borrowing constraint. A recent paper by Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2002), derive borrowing constraints as part of an optimal lending con-
tract in the presence of moral hazard. The nonconvexity due to an outside
(liquidation) option is also present in their model and there is a region where
randomization is optimal.
We have chosen to keep our model stylized in order to get sharper results.
As a downside, our model has some special unrealistic features. Most notably,
19risk-taking occurs only once; if the outcome is favorable, the entrepreneur
takes no further risk and stays in business forever. These results follow from
the possibility of choosing projects with arbitrary risk levels (including a fully
safe one) and equal returns. Risk taking could last for more than one period
if the variance of returns was bounded above. On the other hand, a lower
bound on project risk or a return/risk trade-oﬀ, generates the possibility of
future exit by ﬁrms that are currently outside the randomization region.
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225 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We develop the proof recursively. Assume that the value function VE(w)
in the right hand side of (4) is concave, has unique intersection with R(w),
and to the right of w coincides with the determined in (2) value function
Vl(w) (where w denotes the tangent point between VE(w) and the common
tangent line drawn to VE(w) and R(w)). To complete the proof we must
show that these assumptions imply that (i)-(iii) of the Propositions are sat-
isﬁed and that similar properties hold for the entrepreneurial value function
endogenously determined in (3).
If the entrepreneur chooses a risk-free project, his value function solves
the following dynamic problem:
VF(w) = max[max
k1
fu(w ¡ k1) + ¯R(Ak1)g;max
k2
fu(w ¡ k2) + ¯VE(Ak2)g]
= maxfV1(w);V2(w)g:
(10)
Obviously, deﬁned in this way VF(w) is not concave, although each of the
two functions in the right hand side of (10) is concave. Denote by wH and
wL the wealth levels at which Ak1(wH) = w and Ak2(wL) = w. Obviously,
R(w) < VE(w) implies that V1(wL) < V2(wH) and VF(w) = Vl(w) for w ¸ wH
by deﬁnition of VF(w) and wH. By the ﬁrst order conditions, V 0
1(wL) =
¯AR0(w) = ¯AV 0
E(w) = V 0


















The above implies that the line drawn through (wL;V1(wL)) and (wH;V2(wH))
is tangent to both V1(w) and V2(w). Consequently, V1(wL) > V2(wL) and
V1(wH) < V2(wH). Moreover, this common tangent line is unique because
if there exist another common tangent line with the correspondent tangent
points w0 and w00 then, by uniqueness of intersection of VE(w) and R(w),
AK1(w0) = w and Ak2(w00) = w. The latter, by concavity of R(w) and
VE(w), implies that w0 = wL and w00 = wH.
If the entrepreneur decides to invest in a risky project, the ﬁrst order
conditions (5) must satisfy with equality. Single crossing of VE(w) and R(w)
23implies that xk = w and yk = w. Then from (1) it follows that the prob-
ability of the realization of high payoﬀ p = (Ak ¡ w)=(w ¡ w) is an in-
creasing function of entrepreneurial wealth, i.e. (iii) of the Proposition is
proven. By the ﬁrst order condition with respect to k, the value function
of the entrepreneur is linear if investment into a risky project is optimal:
V 0
E(w) = u0(w¡k) = ¯AV 0
E(w). This implies that by choosing a risky project
the entrepreneur is able to eliminate a nonconcavity in VF(w), and therefore
risky investments are made only if the current wealth of the entrepreneur
falls into (wL;wH). Note that since wH < w and ¯A > 1 entrepreneurs with
wealth level w > w invest in a risk free project and stay in business forever.
Moreover, the condition R(w) > VE(w) is necessary for w to be a tangent
point with the common tangent line to R(w) and VE(w), thus entrepreneurs
exit if w = w. This proves (ii) of the Proposition.
Now we verify that the assumptions made in the ﬁrst paragraph hold.
Concavity of VE(w) is established above. Next, VE(w) = Vl(w) for w ¸ w
since VE(w) = VF(w) = Vl(w) for w ¸ wH and wH · w. As to the unique-
ness of intersection of R(w) and VE(w), additional assumptions on R(w) are
to be made. The necessary condition would be a single crossing property
for R(w) and Vl(w) - quite a standard assumption. If the latter holds, the
multiple intersection of R(w) and VE(w) could occur only if R(w) has more
than one intersection point with the function V1(w). Since the shape of V1(w)
is determined by the shape of R(w), whether or not single crossing property
is satisﬁed for R(w) and VE(w) depends on the properties of R(w), which
so far has not been endogenized. That is why (i) of the Proposition holds
only if exogenously chosen R(w) is such that R(w) and VE(w) have unique
intersection. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
First, we make a number of assumptions about the properties of the en-
trepreneurial value function VE(w): (A1) VE(w) is concave; (A2) VE(w) =
Vl(w) for w ¸ w, where Vl(w) is deﬁned in (2). In the proof of Lemma 3 we
show that these assumptions are indeed satisﬁed.
(i) Assume that R(w) is concave.
It is straightforward to verify that R(w) and VE(w) have at least one
intersection point: (a) R(0) ¸ u(Á)=(1 ¡ ¯) > limw!u u(w)=(1 ¡ ¯) =
VE(0); (b) if R(w) > VE(w) for all w ¸ 0 then Rc(w) = R(w) and,
consequently, R(w) = u(Á+(1¡¯)w)=(1¡¯). Using assumption (A2)
24it is easy to verify that for w > maxfw;Á=(¯ ¡ 1=A)g the inequality
VE(w) = Vl(w) > u(Á + (1 ¡ ¯)w)=(1 ¡ ¯) = R(w) holds, which leads
to the contradiction and implies that at least one intersection point of
R(w) and VE(w) exists.
Then from concavity of both R(w) and VE(w) it follows that the deﬁned
in (8) value function Rc(w) is not concave, which in turns implies that
the deﬁned in (9) function R(w) is not concave either.
(ii)-(iii) If the value function VE(w) is known, the equations (8) and (9) deﬁne
a standard dynamic programming problem that has a unique solution.
To ﬁnd this solution it is enough to construct the value functions R(w)
and Rc(w) and verify that they satisfy (8) and (9).
It is straightforward to show that there exist wE such that R(wE) =
VE(wE) and R(w) < VE(w) for w > wE. This implies that R0(wE) <
V 0
E(wE), from which, by deﬁnition of Rc(w) in (8), it follows that
R0(wE) < R0
c(wE). Using assumption (A1), the concavity of R(w)
and Rc(w) over [wE;+1) is recursively established. Therefore, letting
a(w) denote the optimal saving policy associated with (9), we conclude
that (1+r)a(wE) > wE. Thus there exist a wealth level w0 < wE such
that (1+r)a(w0) = wE and (1+r)a(w) > wE for w > w0 (as depicted
on Figure 5).
Deﬁne a function R0(w) that coincides with R(w) for w ¸ w0, is con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable in w0, and is a straight line for w < w0. Since
R0
0(w0) ¸ limw!wE+ R0
c(w), there exist a common tangent line to R0(w)
and Rc(w) with the correspondent tangent points w0 2 (w0;wE) and












fu(w + Á ¡ a1) + ¯R0((1 + r)a1)g: (12)
Obviously, R1(w0) ¸ R0(w0) since the optimal in (9) saving level
a0(w0) = wE=(1 + r) is available in (12). However, this consump-
tion/saving allocation is not optimal for (12) because the ﬁrst or-
der condition holds with strict inequality: u0(w0 + Á ¡ a0(w0)) =
25¯(1 + r)R0
c(wE) > ¯(1 + r)R0
0(wE). Thus the optimal level of savings
a1(w0) must fall below wE. Consequently, R1(w0) > R0(w0).
Denote by w0
0 the wealth level at which the payoﬀ to the optimal sav-
ings associated with the problem (12) equals to wE, (1+r)a1(w0
0) = wE.
From (1 + r)a1(w0) < wE it follows that w0
0 > w0. Saving level a1(w0
0)
is also feasible in the maximization problem (9), so R1(w0
0) < Rs(w0
0),
where the strict inequality occurs because the ﬁrst order and the en-
velope conditions to (9) are not satisﬁed. This implies that there exist
w¤
0 2 (w0;w0
0) such that R1(w¤
0) = R0(w¤
0) and a1(w¤
0) < wE=(1 + r) <
a0(w¤
0).
Let w1 denote the wealth level at which optimal in (12) saving a1(w1)
equals to w0=(1 + r). Since R0
1(w1) > R0
0(w0), there exist a com-
mon tangent line to R1(w) and Rs(w) with the tangent points w1 2
(w1;w¤
0) and w1 2 (w¤
0;wE) correspondingly. If (c1(w1);a1(w1)) and
(c0(w1);a0(w1)) stand for the correspondent consumption/saving allo-









Now, using the ﬁrst order conditions for (9) and (12) we conclude
that (1 + r)a0(w1) and (1 + r)a1(w1) solve (11), and consequently
(1+r)a0(w1) = w0 and (1+r)a1(w1) = w0. This implies that if w < w1
then (1+r)a1(w) < w0, as well as if w > w1 then (1+r)a0(w) > w0. Fi-
nally, since R0
1(w1) · R0
0(w0), the function maxfR1(w);R0(w);R(w)g,
together with the common tangent lines (passing through w1, w1, and
w0, w0) forms a concave function over (w1;+1).
Determine a sequence of functions fRn(w);n ¸ 1g in a recursive way:
Rn(w) = max
an
fu(w + Á ¡ an) + ¯Rn¡1((1 + r)an)g; (13)
and deﬁne
R(w) = maxfR0(w);R1(w);:::;Rn(w);:::g: (14)
If R(w) has a unique intersection with VE(w) at the point wE then,
obviously, R(w) solves (9) and (8), and the following properties hold:
(1) if w 2 (w¤
n+1;w¤
n) then (1 + r)an+1(w) 2 (w¤
n;w¤
n¡1), i.e. (ii) of the
Lemma holds; (2) if w 2 (wn+1;wn) then (1 + r)an+1(w) 2 (wn;wn¡1),
i.e. (iii) of the Lemma holds.
26In Lemma 3 we show that b R(w) (the concave envelope of R(w)) and
VE(w) satisfy a single crossing property, although intersections of R(w)
and VE(w) may potentially occur within the intervals (wn;wn). If this
happens, the shape of R(w) changes within (wn+1;wn+1), but the shape
of b R(w) and the properties (1) and (2) remain unchanged.
(iv) The last statement of the Lemma is directly implied by the fact that
the concave envelope on maxfR(w);VE(w)g coincides with the concave
envelope on maxfb R(w);VE(w)g. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i) We construct the proof by making the recursive argument: assum-
ing the VE(w) is such that b R(w) and VE(w) have unique intersection
point we show that the similar property holds for the value of the en-
trepreneur VE(w) endogenously deﬁned in (3). At the same time, we
verify recursively that assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold.
Denote by wE the largest point at which R(wE) = VE(wE) holds. Note
that R(w) < VE(w) for w < wE. By construction of R(w) in the
proof of Lemma 2, R(wE) = b R(wE). If wE is the unique intersection
of b R(w) and VE(w), then b R(w) has the shape that was described in
details above. In particular, the property (iii) of Lemma 2 holds.
As in Proposition1, the possibility of risk taking allows entrepreneur to
eliminate all nonconcavities in his next period’s value. Thus, after the
decision about the riskiness of the project has been made, the expected
continuation value of the entrepreneur is given by the concave envelope
of maxfR(w);VE(w)g, which obviously coincides with the concave en-
velope of maxfb R(w);VE(w)g. Thus VE(w) is concave and assumption
(A1) holds. Applying similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition
1 and using assumption (A2), we imply that the current value of the
entrepreneur is a concave envelope on maxfVs(w);Vl(w)g, where
Vs(w) = max
ks
fu(w ¡ ks) + ¯ b R(Aks)g: (15)
Note that due to nonconcavity of R(w) there exist intervals of wealth
within which Vs(w) is linear. If the value of the entrepreneur falls into
one of these intervals, he chooses to invest in a risky project in order to
27eliminate nonconcavity in R(w), but, independently of the realization
of the project’s return, the entrepreneur quits in the following period.
Since b R(w) and VE(w) have unique intersection and both functions
are concave, there is only one randomization region of the next period
wealth, (w;w), in which the probability of business survival is positive
(w and w are the tangent points of b R(w) and VE(w) with their common
tangent line).
Denote by wL and wH the wealth levels at which Aks(wL) = w and
Akl(w) = wH, where kl(w) and ks(w) denote the optimal saving deci-
sions in the problems (2) and (15). Then the sequence of arguments
similar to the one we used in the proof of Proposition 1 implies that wL
and wH are the tangent points of VS(w) and Vl(w) with their common
tangent line. Obviously, VE(w) = Vl(w) for w > wH, so assumption
(A2) holds.
Let us evaluate Vs(wL). Since Aks(wL) = w, Vs(wL) = u(cs(wL)) +
¯ b R(w), and by the ﬁrst order condition u0(cs(wL)) = ¯Ab R0(w). By con-
struction of b R(w), there exists w0 < w such that b R(w0) = R(w0) and the
optimal savings of the worker at w0 are such that (1+r)a(w0) = w. Then
b R(w0) = u(cR(w0)) + ¯ b R(w), and u0(cR(w0)) = ¯(1 + r)b R0(w). Since
1+r < A, u0(cR(w0)) < u0(cs(wL)), and, consequently, cR(w0) > cs(wL).
Therefore, Vs(wL) < b R(w0) < b R(w). Note also that this property im-
plies that there exists a positive lower bound on the probability of
survival of the businesses with risky investment.
Since VS(wL) < b R(w) and VE(w) is linear in the interval (wL;wH), the
multiple intersection of b R(w) and the derived VE(w) may occur only if
Vs(w) and b R(w) have a multiple intersection as it is shown on Figure
6. (Remember that Vs(0) = u(0) + ¯R(0) = u(0) + ¯u(Á)=(1 ¡ ¯) <
u(Á)=(1¡¯) = R(0).) If this happens, there exist w1 and w2 such that
V 0
s(w1) = b R0(w2) = (b R(w2) ¡ Vs(w1))=(w2 ¡ w1) and Vs(w1) < b R(w2).
Since w1 < wL, the continuation wealth of the entrepreneur with the
current wealth w1 is equal to w0
1 = Aks(w1) < w. Letting w0
2 de-
note the continuation wealth of the worker at w2 and using (iii) of
Lemma 2, ¯Ab R0(w0
1) = V 0
s(w1) = b R0(w2) = ¯(1 + r)b R0(w0
2). Thus
b R0(w0
1) < b R0(w0
2), which by concavity of b R(w) implies that b R(w0
1) >
b R(w0
2). Therefore, since agents’ consumption levels at w1 and w2 co-
28incide, the inequality Vs(w1) > b R(w2) must hold, which contradicts to
the properties of w1 and w2. Therefore, VE(w) and b R(w) have unique
intersection in wE.
(ii) The sketch of the proof of the second part is described in the paragraph
preceding Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
If q = 1 then Rc(w) = VE(w) for w ¸ wE and VE(w) = Vl(w) for w ¸ w. By
construction of R(w) in the proof of Lemma 2, the tangent point w falls into
the same concave part of R(w) where wE belongs. Denote by w0 the optimal
continuation wealth of the worker whose current wealth level is w. Since
R0(wE) > V 0
E(wE) and ¯(1 + r) ¸ 1, we conclude that w0
E > w0 ¸ w0 > wE
(see Figure 7).
Let w0 be the wealth level at which a risk-free entrepreneur invests k(w0) =
w0
E=A in the project. Then the ﬁrst order conditions and the inequality
1 + r · A imply that the worker at wE consumes more than entrepreneur
at w0. Since the continuation value of both agents equals to VE(w0
E), the
entrepreneur at w0 is worse oﬀ than the worker at wE, R(wE) > VE(wE).
Finally, since w0
E > w, the wealth level wH, at which a risk-free en-
trepreneur invests w=A, is smaller than w0, implying that wH < wE. This
means that no entry occurs within the risk taking interval (wL;wH), and thus
no risky investment is made if q = 1. By continuity, risk taking does not
occur if q is large enough. Q.E.D.
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Figure 6:   Single crossing of Vs(w) and R(w) 
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Figure 7:   No risk taking in case of q=1 